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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore concepts of violence as they relate to
environmental activism. It employs a comparative case study analysis to illustrate that
environmental groups are often labelled “violent” regardless of whether or not they engage in
any sort of physical violence. First, it works to define “violence” and explores the concept of
structural violence as it relates to gender, ethnicity, race, and the environment. It argues that
considering the concept of violence under structural terms is useful in understanding the
populations affected differently by environmental violence and who has the power to name what
constitutes “legitimate” violence.
Second, it argues that environmental activists are labelled “violent” or “terrorists”
not necessarily because they are precipitating some form of violence, but because they threaten
the status quo and structural foundation of the state. The people and groups who receive these
labels are impacted differently by structural violence and thus are less able to legitimate
whatever perceived acts of violence they are committing. It concludes with a call for further
research into the relationship between violence and environmental activism.
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Chapter 1: Structures of Environmental Violence
Introduction
On October 11, 2016, a group of five individuals coordinated the closing of pipeline
valves across four states as an act of environmental protest. Since the incident, the group has
been dubbed the “Valve Turners” and has been listed as a “domestic terrorism threat” by the
Department of Homeland Security. No individuals were harmed in the closing of the pipeline
valve; moreover, Ken Ward, who was arrested following the event, states, “we put a premium on
minimizing damage to pipeline property, and carefully considered ways to minimize any
violations of the law. We called the pipeline companies beforehand and waited around
afterwards for the police to arrest us (nearly an hour in two cases)” (Ward 2020).
The situation that Ward describes here is a common theme surrounding environmental
protests across the world, as acts of nonviolent environmental protest are increasingly labelled
“terrorism” or “violent.” The terms “eco-terrorism” and “terrorism” more broadly have been
used by various political actors, scholars, and news media to describe acts of economic sabotage
for environmental purposes. More recently, the labels have been applied to other types of
environmental resistance (such as pipeline and extraction protests) as violence and punitive
measures against environmental activists continue to rise across the world. This project uses
news and mixed-media discourse to analyze the externally given construction of “violent”
identities of environmental activists across cases in the U.S. and abroad, as well as various forms
of violence and surveillance experienced by environmental resisters.
U.S. domestic pipeline protects have gained global attention in recent years following
violent interactions between protestors and security forces. For example, news sources and
documentary footage revealed violent interactions with protestors that included the use of mace,
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pepper spray, water cannons, etc., as Dakota Access Pipeline police and private security
company TigerSwan raided the Oceti Sakowin protest camp. Pipeline protests also generated
discussion on the supposed links between nonviolent protest and “violence,” as terms like
“ecoterrorists” and “criminals” appeared across news outlets and political discourse.
Interestingly, other groups historically labelled “ecoterrorists” usually emphasize commitments
to nonviolence (Earth Liberation Front 2020; Animal Liberation Front 2020).
Some news sources note sharp increases in violence against land defenders and extraction
and infrastructure opposition globally, with a large concentration clustered in Brazil, Colombia,
and the Philippines (United Nations Development Programme 2018; National Public Radio
2019; Ulmanu et al. 2017). As rates of violence against environmental activists appear to be on
the rise, the relationship between that violence and the framing used by various state and
private actors merits exploration. My research is beneficial to international security studies and
international relations more broadly, as it provides insight into the role of power exercised by
individual political actors and institutions in favor of protecting corporations, land rights, and
colonial and patriarchal norms. It is especially useful for research in terrorism and political
violence, as it attests to ambiguous and strategic usages of the “terrorist” label and the framing of
violence in a less conventional way.
Some research has been done on “ecoterrorism,” much of which follows the declaration
of the War on Terror at the turn of the twenty-first century (Vanderheiden 2005; Trujillo 2005;
Loadenthal 2013; Hirsch-Hoefler and Mudde 2014). It does not, however, encompass broader
and more recent dialogue about environmental activists and defenders’ susceptibility to receiving
violent labels or the implications of the employment of those violent labels. Research in
international security studies regarding the relationship between environmental activism and
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violence is limited but would provide important considerations for understanding the concepts of
terrorism, political violence, and violence overall within the field.
This project seeks to explore the following research question: “in what ways is
environmental activism connected to violence?” I argue that violence has a structural component;
our global structure (and many state structures) are contingent on environmental subjugation and
environmental violence, and that structural environmental violence often manifests differently
across genders, races, geographical locations, ethnicities, and income levels. Violence is not
simply direct and physical; it is broad and complicated. Conceptualizing violence as structural
allows for the questioning of who names legitimate or acceptable forms of “violence.” As
individuals and groups react to manifestations of structural violence with environmental
activism, they are labelled “violent” and “terrorists” because they threaten the fabric of the
structure that is founded on exploitation.
Defining violence
This chapter analyzes definitions of violence as they pertain to disempowerment under
structures such as colonialism, white supremacy, and patriarchy, as well as the ways that these
structures interact with the creation and reinforcement of structural environmental violence. In
some ways, all are threatened by environmental violence under increasing threats such as climate
change and natural disasters; however, a substantial amount of literature points to the fact that
marginalized communities around the globe are even more vulnerable to environmental violence
(Bullard 1990; Bullard 2005).
I argue that violence is bound into these structures and is necessary for their continuation
with specific attention to the relationship of those structures to environmental violence.
Structural violence is a very broad concept, so I also use human security frames to identify some
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of the ways that individuals are impacted by those manifestations of structural violence. I
ultimately argue that understanding “violence” as a structure broadens the lens for viewing
“violent” instances and situations perpetrated by those repressed under that structure;
additionally, “structural violence” helps to provide a framework for who has the power to name
“violence” in a structure.
In this section, I work to define “violence” as it pertains to environmental activism by
drawing from Johan Galtung’s distinctions of “direct,” “indirect,” and “structural” violence. I am
primarily concerned with the latter and suggest that human security frames are helpful in parsing
out the specific ways that structural violence manifests, as I aim to consider “violence” in very
broad terms. I ultimately argue that environmental violence, gender-based violence, and
racial/ethnic violence are crucial for the makeup of our current global structure, which
consistently reinforces these various forms of violence to maintain itself. Defining violence in
these terms helps to provide some backdrop into the ways that activism challenges these
structural dynamics and the ways that state, media, and private actors respond to that activism
(by labelling it “violent” or “terror” or inflicting violence onto them).
In many cases, direct violence against environmental activists has ties to resource
extraction, particularly across Latin America (Shriver et al. 2013; Narchi 2015; Fletcher 2018;
Deonondan and Bell 2019). Although 60% of murders of environmental activists occurred in
Latin America, the trend is a worldwide phenomenon. Murders of environmental activists were
reported across the world, with high numbers also present in the Philippines and Africa,
specifically the Democratic Republic of Congo (Global Witness). Direct violence against
environmental activists can take many forms and can be initiated by a variety of actors and often
includes military and security forces. Less attention has been paid to the negative conceptions of
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environmentalists formulated by various actors; some argue that the framing of environmental
activism as “violent” is itself a foundation for violence against environmental activists (Shriver
et al. 2013).
Some research has separated forms of environmental violence into two categories: direct
and indirect violence (White 2009; Shriver et al. 2013; Fletcher 2018; Deonondan and Bell
2019). Although the lines between these two distinctions can often become blurred, direct
violence is most frequently conceptualized as death, sexual assault, and other instances of
physical harm to activists, while indirect violence is broader and more abstract.
Indirect violence can specify a variety of things, but some research includes negative framing
and labelling of environmental activists as “violent” as a form of indirect violence (Shriver et al
2013). For example, Shriver et al. (2013) provide evidence of state involvement in a campaign
designed to denigrate environmental activists through a study in the Czech Republic. They
contend that the state employed the aid of state officials and some private actors in a
countermovement strategy that ended in increased direct violence and harassment toward
environmentalists. Shriver et al.’s work illuminates the increased vulnerability to violence that
can result from the negative framing of environmental activism and activists. This illustrates the
multifaceted nature of violence that I emphasize throughout this chapter.
In some instances, physical contact with environmental activists may even become more
prevalent as negative discourse surrounding activists escalates (Fletcher 2018; Deonondan and
Bell 2019). However, if one understands harassment, threats, poverty, and other facets of human
insecurity alone as forms of violence, an end- game of direct bodily harm is unnecessary for a
definition of indirect violence. Indirect violence shares some similarities to the concept of
“structural violence” that I discuss at length in the following section. Like indirect violence,
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structural violence does not share the same immediacy often associated with more direct and
visible forms of violence. Considering these more abstract, intangible forms of violence helps to
better understand an incident of protest not as isolated but as part of a broader picture of
retaliation under an oppressive structure.
Violence as structure
Structural violence stems from the understanding that human insecurity itself is a form of
indirect violence; structural conditions, both economic and social, can end with suffering and
death as a result of economic and social inequalities (Galtung 1969; Tickner 1995; Narchi 2015).
Galtung emphasizes that distinctions between direct and indirect violence are based on whether
or not there is a clear actor perpetrating the violence; both might end in physical harm, but direct
violence can be traced back to a concrete actor. Indirect violence is “built into the structure and
shows up as unequal power and unequal life chances” (Galtung 1969, 171). This is important to
my analysis because violence inflicted onto environmentalists should not only be understood as
direct and physical, but indirect and structural as well. Whether industrial expansion invaded
territories or contributed to environmental degradation more broadly, it often privileges wealthy
individuals and corporations. In contrast, vulnerable groups and individuals often bear the brunt
of environmental degradation in many ways (Bullard 1990; Bullard 2005). While state or private
actors manifest that structural violence with acts of direct violence, the flaw lies within the
structure itself both within the state and in transnational industrial interests. These structures are
often based in industrial and colonial expansion and patriarchal norms, which rely on violence
and inequality as a basis for their existence, as well as tools to maintain it.
Human security frames separate these into broad threats to human security:
environmental security, gender security, food security, health security, community security,
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personal security, economic security, and political security (United Nations Development
Programme 1994). Security frames are clearly helpful for identifying a direct, physical violence
caused by a lack of security or simply feeling insecure. If one has limited access to food and
health security, this will likely cause negative concerns for their health or physical well-being. If
someone is experiencing or fears sexual assault as it corresponds to their gender, this can
negatively impact both body and mind.
Security frames are helpful in specifying more in-depth dimensions of broader concepts
of structural violence – for example, there are state and global structural inequalities that dictate
who has greater access to food, to political representation, to body autonomy, etc. Structural
violence surely impacts human security; Schnabel (2007) offers human security frames as a
helpful component in identifying the types of abstract threats that Galtung references with
structural violence (which, admittedly, can be somewhat challenging to narrow in scope).
Providing human security certainly entails mitigating violence and acknowledges the state’s
responsibility in preventing future violence, offering a vessel for establishing a practical
response.
Using “structural violence” alongside human security frames is not only helpful in
identifying more specific elements of violence but allows for a closer emphasis on what I
understand to be a major indicator of structural inequality – the power to name and to frame. I
am referencing a quote from Schnabel (2007)’s call to wed structural violence and human
security frames to illustrate my point: “economically or politically marginalized populations that
suffer from structural violence may breed extremist violence (insurgency or terrorism)” (92). Not
only are economically and politically marginalized populations suffering from direct violence
differently than others, they are now labelled extremist “insurgents” and “terrorists” (which often
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contributes to even more violence used against them by “counterinsurgency” and
“counterterrorist” forces). Naming and framing as “insurgency” and “terrorism” is a move
allotted to those in power within a structure.
Take, for example, the case of Ken Ward and the “Valve Turners.” Labelling what Ken
Ward and the other “Valve Turners” did “domestic terrorism” was an act perpetrated by the
officials of the Department of Homeland Security. Their position within the framework of the
U.S. legal system allows them to label someone a “terrorist,” and their position within that
system thus allows them to take whatever measures are deemed necessary in order to quell the
“threat.” Ken Ward and the other “valve turners” are not in a position to label what constitutes
“terrorism” or “violence” under the law, although they seemingly viewed the environmental
impacts of those pipelines dangerous enough to humanity that they were willing to risk a prison
sentence to take action.
The Valve Turners’ positions within the structures I have described are complicated: “all
are white, all are college- educated and none are truly poor. While all are deeply concerned about
climate change, none are immediately threatened by its worst effects. . . .all say that it is this
relative safety – and the relative advantages of age, race, education and wealth – that makes them
feel they have a particular responsibility, as climate activists, to push the boundaries of civil
disobedience” (Nijhuis 2018). In many ways, the United States is structured to favor people like
them from a demographic standpoint. However, as they threaten industry, they are still
threatening the makeup of that structure, rendering them powerless in being described as
“terrorists.”
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Structures of environmental violence
The sentiments of the Valve Turners illustrate interactions between environmental
violence and other oppressive structures that might by experienced based on one’s wealth,
location, or race – the Valve Turners are aware that the entire world is increasingly being
threatened by climate change, although they themselves will not yet bear the immediate brunt of
it. Structural violence can be linked to environmental subjugation and degradation in several
ways. First, violence should be viewed as a broad and multifaceted concept that includes not
only physical violence but psychological violence, community violence, gender-based violence,
etc. Structural environmental violence thus positions perpetrators of environmental harms
favorably to groups more vulnerable to environmental degradation or natural disasters because of
where they live or their access to basic needs. Although the effects are pronounced among
vulnerable populations, peoples of all walks of life are increasingly exposed to environmental
violence or living in environmental insecurity due to natural disasters, pollution, and climate
change.
In 2011, Rob Nixon coined the phrase “slow violence” to describe a peripheral
environmental violence that lacks the immediacy and visibility of other, quicker, types of
violence. Similar to Galtung’s “structural violence,” Nixon urges readers to broaden their
understandings of what does and does not constitute “violence” and if violence can or should
include instances such as toxic waste-dumping into poorer countries. Environmental violence,
then, is still capable of causing the types of physical or psychiatric damage that a burning
building might cause, but it is instead susceptible to diminished visibility and questions of
agency (who initiated or contributed to the slow violence or if it is indeed just a “natural”
phenomenon).

9

I emphasize that not only is environmental violence often initiated by powerful, wealthy
groups, it is necessary for their creation and maintenance altogether. Oil expansion and other
industrial enterprises have often historically relied on encroachment into indigenous territories,
which threatens indigenous environmental security on its own; as oil expansion continues,
contamination into natural resources continues, threatening indigenous health but also often the
health of other populations, such as the residents of the city of Flint, Michigan (Culqui 2010;
Huaynate 2012; Bellinger 2016). Violence against people and the environment was present from
the inception of these types of practices, and oil pipeline expansion cannot continue without
continuing to threaten indigenous populations.
If a corporation or wealthy state’s foundation of environmental subjugation is necessary
to maintain that structure, the structure cannot exist without that subjugation. This can be applied
to many other levels of analysis, whether globally or internally across genders, races, religions,
etc. The “visibility” of slow violence is also crucial; just as slow violence is essentially out-ofsight and perpetrated by the powerful, the “wealthy” are able to construct narratives of what
actually constitutes “violence” (which usually does not include themselves).
Second, groups and individuals have suffered from direct violence by state and private
actors for resource extraction or territorial conquest (both contemporarily and historically
through imperial conquest and slavery). Downey et al. (2010) highlight the structural dynamics
of armed conflict as it corresponds to environmental violence, as military or police forces often
respond with violence to environmental protest, employ forced labor for extractive purposes,
forcibly remove local populations for conquest and extraction, etc. These individuals are acting
as direct agents of the state to maintain a violent structure that privileges industrialization and
wealth over human security and wellbeing and environmental security and sustainability.
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Ultimately, I argue that environmental degradation is crucial to the structural foundation
of our current global order, as well as a necessary element in creating and maintaining many
state structures; under global capitalism, the earth and the environment are often viewed as a
resource exploitable for profit (for states with histories of settler-colonialism, environmental
subjugation often corresponds with the exploitation of peoples). Moreover, state sovereignty and
state self-interest are enmeshed in the foundation of the state and the global system altogether.
It is unsurprising that various forms of violence are used to maintain these structures, but
I emphasize that they are crucial to the base of the structure itself. “Activism” or resistance
threatens these structures because of these groups’ sheer existence, not because they are
necessarily “violent” (although some are, in various ways). Many groups offer only property
damage or nonviolent protest and are still categorized as “terrorists” or “violent” because they
threaten the foundation of a global system; environmental exploitation is intrinsic to the fabric of
the state, and it is necessary for its maintenance.
Methods and design
This project will use a mixed-media discourse analysis to compare the indigenous-led
2016 Dakota Access Pipeline protests in the United States and the 2009 Peruvian political crisis
that arose in opposition to the further development of oil pipelines across the Dakotas and in the
Peruvian Amazon. Although these states differ in many ways, they were selected for case
comparisons because of reported violence following anti-extraction and land invasion protests
between environmental defenders and police. Both were indigenous-led, and both resulted in the
employment of “terrorism” accusations and some level of conflict with private and state security
forces. I am using an illustrative comparative case study and discourse analysis, because it allows
for an in-depth glimpse of the cases for critical analysis. This allows for analysis of discourse
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among news media, government officials, security forces, and the protestors affected by the
development of these pipelines. In the future, I would like to expand to include other case studies
to include an even broader portrait of the positions that I argue.
I am using mixed-media sources for a couple of reasons: academic work on these subjects
are limited, and this allows me to incorporate the viewpoints of those peoples actually involved
in these events. I acknowledge that the documentary and news sources used throughout the paper
could potentially be problematic, as they are not held to the same peer review process undergone
by academic research and are thus susceptible to bias in achieving the goals of the work. I have
worked to correlate most facts presented in the documentaries and news sources with other
academic sources; although filmmakers and journalists likely have certain goals in mind during
the creation process of these films and articles, I attempt to take at face value the dialogue of the
protestors and other actors involved as they convey their own experiences.
This paper also acknowledges the problematic nature of labelling persons or groups as
“activists” when such activism has not necessarily been self-proclaimed. It also acknowledges
major distinctions between indigenous resistance and environmental activism more broadly,
including (but not limited to) cultural complexities and histories of marginalization and
genocide. It is my aim to establish some of the ways in which state and political actors align with
and protect industry and corporations over people affected by whatever environmental harms
may arise from industrial environmental degradation; I do not, however, intend to suggest that all
people or peoples are affected equally by environmental harms.
Language barriers may also exist with some primary news sources, documentary sources,
and literature. The documentary sources that I am analyzing have been translated to English, and
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I translate online written material via internet translation services. There may exist some flaws or
misinterpretations in translation that I do my best to avoid.
Gender and structural environmental violence
Just as structural violence should be understood as it relates to the environment,
colonialism, and race, some feminists have also labelled patriarchy an inherently violent
structure (Tickner 1995). I am using the term “patriarchy” to loosely describe structures of
gender-based oppression, which can include a multitude of things (such as sexual violence, a
lack of political representation for women, gender norms, etc.). Defining “patriarchy” as a
unified system of male domination can be problematic, because it can obscure the ways that
things like race and geographical location can interact with gender in systems of oppression and
difference. I will further address the intersectional nature of these systems throughout the paper.
“Patriarchy” is not intended here to define the attitudes or behaviors of individual men,
but a structure that has historically placed women in positions of subordination that have
contributed to different experiences of violence and insecurity for both women and men. It is
important to emphasize that gender roles and experiences look different across cultures and
attempts to essentialize them can prove to be very problematic, but some have highlighted
similarities across them. As this relates to environmental violence, women are often caregivers
for households and responsible for household tasks and food security. When food is scarce or
when natural disasters strike, women are often placed in situations of increased insecurity as they
attempt to continue to provide care, food, etc. (Detraz 2012).
As gender roles relate to patriarchal structures, I emphasize here that I am not suggesting
that women in caregiving roles are always “oppressed” or even necessarily doing something that
makes them unhappy. Many women actively choose these roles for a multitude of reasons;
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however, it is evident that women’s roles as caregivers can sometimes place them in situations of
increased vulnerability, ranging from the instances just mentioned to other types of economic
vulnerability (as they are most often not financially compensated for these responsibilities).
Just as women are affected differently by more indirect forms of violence just mentioned, they
are also often placed in different positions to respond. Detraz (2012) suggests that women are
often viewed ether as responsible for perpetrating certain environmental harms, victims of
environmental harms, or viewed as responsible for “saving” the environment from its current
state. These roles often correspond with perceptions about the nature of women (the idea that
women are inherently “loving” or capable of a different kind of care – or less violence - than
men). These ideas certainly can essentialize women’s roles in environmental change but
ultimately stress ideas about what women are or should be that are bound in a patriarchal
structure that prescribes capacities for action based on gender expression.
Race, ethnicity, and structural environmental violence
Structural violence affects individuals and groups relative to their positions within a
structure. Thus, women, persons or groups in lower economic positions, and marginalized
communities are often affected differently by environmental violence than individuals or groups
within other parts of the structure based on geography, access to resources, or daily
responsibilities. It is widely accepted that lower-income communities and people of color are
often affected uniquely by environmental pollution and climate change disasters both in the U.S.
and globally (Bullard 1994; Couch et al. 2003). This has been labelled both “environmental
racism” and “environmental injustice.” I am interested in identifying some of the ways that racial
injustices are connected to concepts of environmental violence and insecurity. First, I have
touched on Nixon (2011)’s claim that instances such as toxic waste disposal into poorer countries
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should be categorized as “slow violence.” While the racial makeup of the world’s wealthiest
countries varies (Qatar; Macao SAR; Luxembourg, etc.), countries falling in the lower half of
income disparities are predominately nonwhite and largely concentrated in parts of Africa and
Latin America (World Atlas 2019). As 90% of waste is openly dumped or burned in the world’s
lowest income countries, it is often the poor who are the recipients of undue environmental
violence; “waste landslides” have buried homes and people under piles of waste, drains have
clogged, and respiratory problems have increased (World Bank 2018).
Within the U.S. specifically, lower-income communities are often deprived of clean
drinking water, exposed to pollution, and are less able than higher-income communities to cope
with increasing temperatures. These lower-income communities are disproportionately nonwhite.
Pulido (2017) suggests that environmental racism can be understood as the continuity of statesanctioned violence that is racial capitalism. Through this reading, racial violence, injustice, and
oppression were imperative for the establishment of the United States’ dependence on capital
and industry through slavery and colonial expansion (Robinson 1983). Just as the state was
dependent on the violent exploitation of nonwhite individuals at its inception, it continues to be
dependent on them for the “sinks” (places where pollution is stored) necessary to maintain
industry. People of color are often in closest proximity to these “sinks,” but Pulido takes this a
step further, arguing that nonwhite bodies are viewed as dispensable to the state and therefore
can be understood as “sinks” themselves. Nixon’s “slow violence” also highlights the
disposability of peoples in poorer countries for industry and global capital.
I have just identified some of the ways in which global structures contribute to the direct,
physical violence of nonwhite individuals. Following authors like Nixon (2011) and Pulido
(2017), I argue that the foundational structure of the United States is contingent on direct
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violence against nonwhite bodies and communities. direct, physical violence via climate
catastrophes, waste disposal, pollution, and more. In addition to the types of direct violence
resulting from structural inequalities that I have just identified, it is apparent that structural
violence can include broader, more indirect violence as well. The capacity for this list is
seemingly endless, so I will attempt to highlight a few that are important to this analysis. As
structural violence is indeed a very broad category, human security frames are helpful to indicate
structural threats in greater detail.
Violence, and the fear that accompanies violence, is certainly comprised of a
psychological component. The “freedom from fear and freedom from want” that human security
studies validates is not only an immediate, physical insecurity but a psychological insecurity
found within all of its security categories. For example, the 1994 Human Development Report
cites a lack of access to water stemming from climate change as a major factor for
“environmental insecurity.” Besides the obvious health risks related to a lack of access to clean
drinking water, individuals might also suffer from psychological pains as a result of that lack of
access to water (for themselves or for those close to them).
I later provide a more in-depth analysis of the types of structural security threats realized
by indigenous populations in the United States and Latin America for the specific cases selected.
A closer inspection of possible sources of insecurity for specific populations is warranted, as
customs, traditions, and locations vary among them like any other populations. It can be
problematic to use security frames to describe cases in which individuals themselves do not
necessarily use those frames themselves. However, the inclusion of the various types of
insecurity inflicted onto indigenous populations is beneficial for understanding the structural
violence underlying the various types of insecurity inflicted onto environmental activists. These
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security threats might include state encroachment into land historically inhabited by indigenous
populations; in addition to threats to physical wellbeing, community security frames are helpful
for analyzing some of the ways in which groups themselves can be made insecure by the state (or
who are arguably made insecure by the sheer existence of the state).
Environmental activism and the “violent” identity
The previous discussion identified some of the ways that environmental violence is
embedded in state and global structures and realized differently by groups and individuals
relative to their positions within the structure. I ultimately argue that environmental subjugation
is itself woven into the fabric of the state, but it is often experienced differently by different
individuals or groups based on their positions within that structure. In a patriarchal structure,
women are often affected differently based on their position within the structure relative to men.
In a racial hierarchical structure, nonwhite individuals are often affected differently than white
individuals. In a neocolonial world, indigenous peoples are often affected by environmental
violence differently than non-indigenous peoples.
I define “violence” not just as direct, physical threats but as a broader system of violence
than can be slower rather than immediate. It can encompass psychological harms or work to
make individuals feel insecure in many ways. Understanding violence and insecurity as
structural contributes to the claim that I will make in my next chapter: that environmental
activism is often labelled “violent” or “terrorism” not necessarily because of any type of physical
violence that is exhibited by activists, but because it threatens the structural norms I have just
described. The tendency to label environmental activists “violent” or “terrorists” further attests to
the idea that violence is structural; individuals involved in environmental activism or resistance
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receive these derogatory labels because of their position within the structure. They do not have
the “power to name” (Bhatia 2007).
Chapter Two: Identities of Violence and Terror
In January 2020, The Guardian reported that the London Terrorism Policing Unit had
distributed a twenty-four page document to medical professionals and teachers as a measure of
caution and “prevention strategy” for the “terrorist” threat allegedly presented by
environmentally-oriented groups, which included Greenpeace and Extinction Rebellion.
Although the groups have only been involved in nonviolent protests or occasional bouts of
property damage, the document placed environmental activist campaigns on par with neo-Nazi
and “jihadist” groups that have long threatened or enacted physical violence onto civilians (Dodd
and Grierson 2020).
The article described here is one of many instances of state and local police forces
labelling nonviolent environmental activism as “violent” or “a terrorism threat” throughout the
last several decades. Following the United States’ declaration of the War on Terror after the
attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, FBI Counter-terrorism Chief James
Jarboe defined “eco-terrorism” before the House Resources Committee as “the use or threatened
use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentallyoriented, subnational group for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond
the target, often of a symbolic nature” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2019). At this time, the
Environmental Liberation Front (“ELF”) had claimed multiple incidents of property damage
across the United States, such as damage to ski resorts and the destruction of private property.
The Animal Liberation Front (“ALF”) claimed incidents of animal liberation from
slaughterhouses and animal testing centers, often without even damaging property. Jarboe is here
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using a term that equates environmental activism to a large-scale attack that cost hundreds of
lives and of which paved the way for extralegal imprisonment and torture tactics to be inflicted
onto alleged non-American “jihadist terrorists” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2019).
“Terrorism” has recently been used to describe acts of environmental (often indigenousled) protests across the globe. The 2016 Dakota Access Pipeline protests, of which I elaborate
further in chapter three, In chapter three, I go into further analysis on the 2016 Dakota Access
Pipeline protests in the United States. In this case, the indigenous-led protest was described as
“terrorism” by private security forces and news media despite the presence of neither acts of
violence nor intent to initiate violence by the protestors. In this case, protestors did not even
inflict any sort of property damage; they simply interfered with the further construction of the
Dakota Access Pipeline (Brown et al. 2017).
In other cases, land defense protests do end in bloodshed and death. For example, in 2009
Peru, a coalition of indigenous peoples formed in order to protest oil development in the
Peruvian Amazon. After a series of unsuccessful negotiation talks between tribal leaders and
leaders of the Peruvian state government, protests eventually turned violent, and President Alan
Garcia declared a state of emergency. Ten natives and civilians and twenty-three police officers
were killed, and around one hundred and fifty were injured (Bradenburg and Orzel 2016).
I argue that the precipitation of direct, physical violence is nonessential for groups to
receive derogatory, “violent” labels. Rather, they often receive such labels simply because of
their identities, which are positioned antithetically to the foundation and continuation of the state.
“Violence” initiated or allegedly initiated by oppressed peoples certainly adds ammunition to
dialogue and accusations about their perceived goals, but the dialogue is often already present to
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begin with. Lastly, their place within a structure founded in and dependent on violence can make
such violence retaliatory, as the state itself is structured against them.
An introduction to “eco-terrorism”
Throughout this paper, I primarily focus on two indigenous-led protests that garnered
support from the broader environmental movement. I reflect on earlier scholarship and political
discourse on “eco-terrorism” throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s, because the rhetoric
surrounding the acts put forth by these groups share stark similarities to the descriptions of the
oil pipeline and extraction protests of recent years – these acts were nonviolent, but they were
still labelled “terrorism.”
I argue that identity, rather than acts perpetrated by the supposed “terrorist,” is enough to
inspire the external label of “terrorism.” Earlier environmental groups that prompted the
“terrorist” label, however, were largely comprised of white individuals; this presents the most
major difference between these earlier “eco-terrorist” groups and the indigenous-led protests I
describe throughout the rest of the paper. White eco-terrorists receive the label after engaging in
voluntary acts of environmental protests or economic sabotage. Nonwhite, indigenous
“terrorists” and colonized peoples have long suffered from such associations and earn them
before engaging in any sort of “act” (Fanon 1963; Schotten 2018). I further elaborate on the
following claims throughout chapters two and three: colonized and indigenous identities threaten
the status quo and framework of a neoliberal, (neo)colonial state. They are born into these
identities and thus are the “terrorists” regardless of engagement in any sort of violence or
threatening act; their very identity is a threatening act (Schotten 2018).
I argue that white “eco-terrorists” do something similar when they threaten industrial
enterprise and capitalist development (which are both inseparable from the status quo and
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framework of the neoliberal, neocolonial state). While they usually receive this label following
an action, a “radical” identity is imposed onto them that indicates their deviation from the status
quo and perceived “threat” to the future of the norms of the state. An association with the
“radical” aspects of the environmental movement are enough to warrant this “radical” identity; if
these environmental aims were established, they would alter the framework of the neoliberal,
capitalist state. I emphasize here that whiteness is certainly allotted many privileges, and white
environmentalists might be able to shed the “terrorist” identity by disassociating from the
movement in a way that nonwhite, indigenous activists cannot. This receives further elaboration
in chapter three.
Groups like Earth First! and the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF), which followed
the development of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) at the close of the 1970’s, are primarily
associated with eco-terrorism. Since the 1980’s, the ELF has claimed ownership of property
damage across the country on various occasions, including acts like setting fire to ski resorts, car
lots, etc. According to the FBI report, ELF advocates “monkeywrenching” (the property damage
of perceived perpetrators of environmental harms and abuses) through a variety of tactics: arson,
damage to logging or construction equipment, etc. “Monkeywrenching” represents the act of
throwing a wrench into the system (Love 2006).
ALF’s website features persons clad in camouflage and black ski masks posing with
animals; their guidelines call for “economic damage to those who profit from the misery and
exploitation of animals” and “[the taking] of all necessary precautions against harming any
animal, human or nonhuman.” Guidelines also include a “Isn’t This Terrorism?” feature in which
the term is rejected outright: “not one human or animal has ever been harmed by the ALF. . .
activists as terrorists trivializes real terrorism and clouds the true nature of the ALF.” The FBI
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website emphasizes ALF’s destruction of various farms, restaurants, laboratories, and
companies. Despite acknowledging the nonviolent philosophy of the movement, the website also
states, “the ALF is considered a terrorist group whose purpose is to bring about social and
political change through the use of force and violence.”
Both groups seem to view “terrorism” or “real terrorism” as something concrete,
definable, and involving some form of violence. ALF’s adamant rejection of the “terrorist” label
seems to indicate that ALF believes that there are undesirable implications of receiving such a
label, as well indicating that there is something called “terrorism” that is clearly definable and
should not include them. Within a few paragraphs, the FBI website inconsistently labels ALF as
both violent and nonviolent; continued emphasis on property damage also makes evident that the
two groups are defining violence differently. Mathias Thaler refers to these discrepancies in the
definitions of what terms signify as differences in concept-formation (Thaler 2018). More
explicitly, the FBI appears to view physical bodily harm as something similar to, equitable to, or
even inseparable from damage to property or simply interference with property (which, for the
FBI, seems to include both animals and inanimate objects). ALF, in contrast, does not seem to
define violence in a way that encompasses property damage or the liberation of animals (even
when that liberation inhibits monetary gain).
Groups like ELF, ALF, Earth First!, and others are impatient or hopeless with the state of
incremental political changes toward (or against) environmental and animal protections (ELF
2019). In a call to action on Earth First!’s “About” page, the group asks: “are you tired of
namby-pamby environmental groups? Are you tired of overpaid corporate environmentalists who
suck up to bureaucrats and industry? Have you become disempowered by the reductionist
approach of environmental professionals and scientists?” It is clear that these groups are
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disenchanted with the state of environmental and animal relations and believe a “radical”
response is warranted and necessary.
Scholarship on “eco-terrorism” abounded throughout the 1990s but diminished in recent
years, along with general discussion on “eco-terror” altogether. Similar to more general
dissension over what constitutes “terrorism,” the concept of eco-terrorism is contested within
academic discourse across cases of both concept-formation and concept-application: what
exactly comprises violence, intent of the perpetrator(s), and the role of fear involved in acts of
“terror” (Loadenthal 2013).
Hirsch-Hoefler and Mudde (2014) maintain that defining intentional property damage or
sabotage by environmental activists as “eco-terrorism” is inconsistent with the characteristics of
other acts defined as “terrorism,” as eco-terror only precipitates property damage rather than
physical violence against human beings. Others take issue with the fact that labeling acts of
environmental activism or ecological sabotage (property sabotaged with ecological motivation)
as terrorism places those acts on par with the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001 (Loadenthal 2013, ALF 2019). For them, using “terrorism” to describe acts of property
damage or sabotage is not an appropriate application of the term (Thaler refers to this as
“concept-application”). Similarly, Vanderheiden concludes that acts of ecotage (sabotage of
property for ecological purposes) are only justified or warranted under extraordinary
circumstances and when they target very specific actors (presumably large corporations inflicting
perceived environmental abuses), emphasizing that moral limits are a necessary component in
creating and maintaining alliances for the overall environmental movement (2005).
Scholars also dispute the role of the intention to instill fear (or to terrorize) among the
targeted populace. Objectors contend that this criterion lacks the random victimization of other
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types of terrorism. Targets are selected due to their perceived damage to the environment; often,
these are large-scale construction ventures by corporations or simply the freeing of animals from
perceived situations of harm. Thus, the general population is not at risk of personal property
damage by environmental groups because they do not control the means of production. It is only
those with the strongest vested interest in the system who will be affected by such property
damage. Regardless of their positions on the matter, most work on eco-terrorism is focused on
finding a cohesive definition or determining when acts of ecotage or eco-terror fit the definition
or are justified or warranted.
“Terrorism” as structural threat
In keeping with foundational theorists Johan Galtung (1963), Frantz Fanon (1969), and
contemporary theorist C. Heike Schotten (2018), this section proposes that the label “ecoterrorism” does not necessarily describe any type of physical violence. Rather, the label is
strategically employed in order to protect industrial interests. These three thinkers are helpful for
a few reasons. First, Galtung’s concept of “structural violence” is helpful for considering a
multifaceted concept of “violence.” Additionally, Galtung’s work makes evident that those in
power are often those who are able to dictate what constitutes “legitimate” violence from the
state’s perspective; likewise, they are also able to label and punish what constitutes “illegitimate”
violence (and that can be applied to the concept of “terrorism”). Violences implicit in the
creation and maintenance of the structure are often excused or outright legitimized, because they
are perpetrated in cohesion with the state rather than a subnational group or person.
Although he does not specifically refer to it as “structural violence,” Fanon (1963) takes
great care to emphasize both the physical and psychological effects of the structure that is
colonialism; these effects were necessary for its creation and continue to manifest throughout its
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continuation. Fanon allows for some insight into the broader effects of structural violence under
colonialism specifically. Schotten (2018) provides a link between colonial power and the concept
of “terrorism,” arguing that the “terrorist” is just an extension of the dehumanizing terms
typically used to describe the Other who impedes on the development and perpetuation of the
settler-state and its goals.
In chapter one, I suggested that environmental violence is inherently linked to violence
under other forms of domination more broadly. It inflicts a spectrum of violence onto those who
lack power in the structure, and it allows those individuals at the top of the structure to label
what is “legitimate” violence and what is “illegitimate” violence; denying victims of structural
violence the power to name is itself necessary for the sustenance of the structure. Galtung
(1969)’s “structural violence” is thus a useful tool in deciphering why exactly nonviolent protest
is often framed in derogatory terms (as I argue that these labels are only employed because of the
various ways that activists threaten various structural norms). Although Frantz Fanon (1963)
does not necessarily use this exact term to describe states under colonial rule, he does notably
address the question of normative violence and is therefore very useful in supporting my claim
that resistance through physical violence is irrelevant for ensuing consequences of those labelled
“violent.” Lastly, C. Heike Schotten (2018) directly posits that the “terrorist” identity is created
antithetically to the state, and I argue that this can be broadened to encompass other types of
resistance as structural threat.
Colonialism as violence
As much of my analysis centers around indigenous-led resistance in defense of the land, I
will first analyze the violent structure that is colonialism and its inextricable reliance on
environmental subjugation and industrial allegiances. “Structural violence” suggests that
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violence is built into a system; there is no clear actor perpetrating the violence. The system itself
is violence. As the very foundation of colonialism rests on various forms of violence against
indigenous peoples, is an inherently violent structure. It uses broad forms of violence and
exploitation to sustain itself and ultimately cannot exist without it. For example, Native
American groups within the United States have faced horrific abuses since the inception of the
settler-state; they suffered physical injury and have ultimately suffered near genocide (Renique
2009; Stetson 2012). These physical brutalities are an example of direct violence; certain actors
themselves inflicted those brutalities. Throughout the last century, Native American communities
have been removed from sacred sites and territories and have suffered from immense levels of
poverty and lack of access to resources such as food and water, safe living environments, and
access to healthcare and emergency care. One in three Native American women are twice as
likely to be victims of sexual assaulted in their lifetimes than other women (Wilcox 2019).
Poverty and lack of access to necessities are examples of indirect violence caused by structural
inequalities. There is no clear actor perpetrating such violence; it is slower and more abstract.
Nonetheless, it may cause both physical or mental pains.
These are just a few manifestations of direct and indirect violence often realized by
Native American populations, touching on nearly every facet of human security (community
security, gender security, environmental security, health security, food security, and income
security) (United Nations Development Programme 1994). Clear actors are often involved in
these cases; historically, the U.S. government and military forcibly pushed Native groups
westward from the territories in which they were residing, killing and torturing them in cases like
“The Trail of Tears” (History 2019). However, if the structure that is colonialism is understood
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as violence itself, the sheer existence of the state itself means violence and threat for indigenous
populations.
Although colonial violence should be analyzed in greater depth on a case-by-case basis
across states, some similarities do exist between the types of effects realized by indigenous
populations under environmentally degrading state-sanctioned industrial practices. Oil
expenditures within the region have had damaging effects on the environment, but they are also
deeply impacting the day-to-day lives of inhabitants of the region (Fox et al. 2017). This is an
example of a threat to community security, environmental security, health security, and food
security. More broadly, it is an example of a manifestation of structural violence and native
oppression.
These interrelated structures have oppressed vulnerable groups within their very natures.
As groups have scrambled for survival and some resistance on behalf of their communities, the
environment, and humanity itself, they have been met with not only direct physical violence but
have been labeled “violent,” “terrorists,” “primitive,” etc., which serves to reinforce the
structural dynamics of colonialism that have historically thrived on the demonization and
dehumanization of indigenous communities. While this resistance has triggered violent
responses from state officials, private actors, and news media, it is symptomatic of the very
foundation of the structure.
Frantz Fanon, in his revolutionary work The Wretched of the Earth, describes the system
of violence that is inherently colonialism: “If events go one step further, the leader of the
nationalist party distances himself from the violence. He loudly claims he has nothing to do with
these Mau-Mau, with these terrorists, these butchers” Fanon (1963). Fanon explicitly employs
the terms “terror” and “terrorism” in two ways: he describes a “system of terror” that is
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inherently colonialism, and he acknowledges that colonized resisters have been portrayed as
“terrorists” and “butchers” because of the threat of their existence. Fanon also acknowledges that
indigenous resisters have indeed responded with physical violence to colonial oppression, but the
derogatory labeling of the colonized exists prior to violent resistance. Certainly, there exist
different connotations between twenty-first century conceptions of “terror” and “terror” in the
case of mid-century French Algeria that Fanon describes. Twenty-first century “terrorism” has
been globalized; its employment has been used in various parts of the world (especially the
Western world), and it is often used to describe “jihadist” terrorist attacks.
However, I argue that some similarities do exist. Similarly to colonized groups, the
contemporary “jihadist” is often described as “irrational,” “evil,” and “animalistic” both in
scholarly literature and in news media (Schotten 2018). C. Heike Schotten suggests that the
demonization of Islamic individuals as “terrorists” is in many ways an extension of a sort of
global colonialism- parts of the world with large Islamic populations receive these negative and
problematic labels. The Western world then charges itself with ending the “terrorist” threat with
either direct, physical violence (such as wars, bombings, torture, etc.) or slower violence (such as
economic sanctions, which often contribute to very high death tolls) onto entire populations
(Peksen 2011; Allen and Lektzian 2013). The West often publicly diminishes or ignores Western
involvement that might precipitate “terrorist” responses, minimizing its role in provoking such
retaliatory measures. Schotten parallels this to historical depictions of Native Americans as
“uncouth savages” who threaten Western “civility” and are in need of Western saviorism by any
means necessary. This dynamic can be applied to many other violent structures derived from
colonialism and imperialism, such as the justification for African- American slavery based on
depictions of African- Americans as “inhuman” and “animalistic.”
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Within these cases, the real or alleged violence precipitated by the colonized is irrelevant.
Through the eyes of the actors in power within a structure, the colonized are “terrorists” before
they even initiate any sort of physical violence, because they are perceived as the only ones
capable of such horrible evils. They are labelled uncouth, the animals, the barbarians, irrational,
evil, jihadists. State-sanctioned violence that likely led to such resistance is notably often falsely
legitimized, ignored, or left out of the picture entirely, painting resisters as the perpetrators of
violence.
Structural oppression of indigenous groups is all encompassing and should not be
minimized simply to the types of environmental degradation that contribute to that oppression.
As I further explore in the following sections, I argue common threads do exist between the
demonization of the broader environmental movement (which itself is often enmeshed in
indigenous- led resistance). Like indigenous resisters, non-indigenous environmental activists are
often labelled “terrorists” whether they inflict physical violence or not. Perhaps they are not born
“eco-terrorists” in the same way that colonized peoples, women, or nonwhite people are born
into their identities, but I argue that their associations with a movement that threatens all of the
aforementioned structures places them at risk of being depicted as “terrorists” or “violent.”
Identity and environmental activism
White men labelled “eco-terrorists” in the United States are arguably experiencing
something different than many indigenous women land defenders in Latin America. Their
identities are bound to the structures of colonialism, patriarchy, white supremacy, and
environmental degradation ways. Conversely, the structures themselves are foundationally
hierarchical in a way that protects and privileges the white male identity. However, white men
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have also been charged as “terrorists” within the United States for acts of property damage for
environmentalist causes.
In addition to violence against indigenous peoples, colonial expansion is additionally
reliant on environmental violence. It rests on the conception that the environment is an
expendable resource existing solely for its exploitation, of which the benefactors have
historically been white men (and in some ways, white women, because of their marriages to
those white men). Moreover, the right to exploit the environment has at times even been justified
as divinely ordained by God (Warren 2000). The environment itself resides beneath them on the
structural hierarchy, and violence against it maintains that structure. In a more abstract sense, the
environment is verbally degraded, complex ecosystems are minimized and devalued, and those
associated with the environment are “savage” because of their proximity to it.
Although the identity of the white man is historically separated from the environment and
placed hierarchically above it, acting in its defense threatens the structure that relies on
environmental subjugation and is intrinsically interwoven with patriarchal rule and white
supremacy. To threaten this in some ways threatens all of these structures- the structure itself is
built on the premise that white men own the tip of the umbrella that encapsulates the land and
everyone associated with it (women, children, and nonwhite peoples). Certainly women are not
blameless in the perpetuation of that structure, as the entire population is likely to have
contributed to environmental degradation in some ways, but it is possible that “radical” white
male environmental activists are also greatly removed from the position of power held by other
white men explicitly perpetuating severe environmental harms. These men are not marginalized
by their race, their gender, or their ethnicity; they have likely been allotted many privileges based
on their identity that other identities have not. However, they are still threatening structural
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norms by their perceived “radical” nature. They become a threat to the structure and all that the
structure entails when they are lumped into “terrorism” discourse.
Take, for example, cases of demonization of white male “eco-terrorists” who have acted
in defense of environmental protections. The documentary film If A Tree Falls (which was
produced by Marshall Currey and Sam Cullman and was nominated for an Academy Award for
Best Documentary Feature) depicts the story of ELF activist Daniel G. McGowan, who was
arrested and charged as a “terrorist” for his 1996 arson attacks. McGowan was sentenced to
seven years in prison. No one was killed or injured in McGowan’s arson offenses; he simply
burned down private property. While arson is, indeed, a crime, charging McGowan as a
“terrorist” allows state officials to steepen punishments against environmental activists.
Big Oil is often defended by state actors.
Following the coordinated pipeline shutdown in 2017, eighty-four members of Congress
penned a bipartisan letter to then Attorney General Jeff Sessions urging him to consider the
incident an act of “domestic terrorism,” on the basis that it could potentially cause “physical
injury” or “damage to the environment that they claim to care about” (Carpenter and Williams
2019). Of those eighty-four senators, the only Democrats to sign the letter were from Texas.
Texas comprises 38% of the nation’s oil production and is home to two of the four partners
executing the development of the Keystone XL pipeline’s route through the western United
States, Energy Transfer Partners (headquartered in Dallas) and Phillips 66 (headquartered in
Houston). No sources are cited that state unauthorized valve tampering could cause physical
injury; pipelines themselves are not often positioned near human beings (The Nation 2019). This
letter is one example among many of state officials’ defense of Big Oil and capitalist enterprise
at the expense of indigenous and environmental interests. Signees of the letter are also
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overwhelmingly white men, which is unsurprising given the historical and current makeup of
Congress.
This case of environmental activism threatens industry, and by extension, the structures
in which that industry is based (colonialism and patriarchy). Environmental defenders, regardless
of their race or gender, thus threaten those structures. I argue that this is why they are labelled
“terrorists.” The “eco-terrorist” is here paralleled with the “radical hippie” and the “tree-hugger”
who impedes on the progress and development that is at its core the American way of life and the
foundation of it.
Similarities are present between cases of white U.S. environmental activism and global
land defense. In 2016, activist Berta Caceres was murdered in her home in La Esperanza,
Honduras after a lengthy fight against hydroelectric dam construction within the region. Caceres
had previously had altercations with local and state police forces and private security company
Desarollos Energeticos (DESA) before being killed by DESA forces. Police officers claimed that
Caceres was killed in a “crime of passion” (Blitzer 2019). No arrests were made of the alleged
perpetrators, just Caceres’ fellow activists. Here exists another case of state actors acting in
allegiance to industry. Berta Caceres threatened the patriarchal structure that is industry and
capitalism, just as white male environmental activists have in the United States. Astoundingly, of
the 908 environmental activists murdered in the last decade, only ten perpetrators have been
convicted (Bittner 2014).
Gender and environmental activism
Eco-feminists have long highlighted links between the subjugation of women and the
environment. Both have historically been “backgrounded” in Western states such as the United
States as passive counterparts for white male actors at the forefront of society; this is notably
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represented in the tendency to use feminine pronouns to describe the earth, states, vessels, etc.
Just as the environment has been exploited for the resources it is able to produce, women have
also been exploited in many ways. For example, women’s “worth” has in many cases historically
centered around their capacity to conceive and bear healthy children (and often, preferably, male
children).
Because of bodily functions and the perceived inherent “nature” of women, they have
often been associated with earthliness, irrationality, and animalistic qualities (as have nonwhite
and colonized individuals). As women are often charged with caring for children and household
duties, they are in a sense “rooted” into certain domestic spaces. Men, on the other hand, are
often involved in the political sphere and associated with “rational” thought that transcends the
earthly qualities of woman; they are charged with dominion over the earth, women, children, and
whatever or whomever falls within the bounds of their “property” (Lloyd 1984; Shiva 1989;
Plumwood 1993; Warren 2000).
The dual subjugation of women and the environment have culminated in the present state
of structural environmental violence. On the one hand, most people are in a sense impacted by or
will likely eventually be impacted by environmental violence under the threat of climate change.
As I have already briefly mentioned, however, women are often affected differently by this
structural environmental violence due to the common roles and responsibilities they often hold
within a society (Detraz 2012; Detraz 2017).
Women’s roles in activism and resistance altogether are constrained by the structural
violence of the patriarchy, as women’s voices are often minimized or silenced (and
backgrounded, as I have just mentioned) (Enloe 2004). Women’s positions within a society not
only often place them in different positions in structural violence but also contribute to their
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relationship with environmental activism. Women are heavily represented in environmental
activism, ranging from climate change to animal rights to pollution protests and more (Detraz
2017; Buckingham and Kulchur 2009; Di Chiro 2015).
Early eco-feminism often sought to develop positive associations between women and
nature; others have later criticized the idea that women are somehow intrinsically more inclined
to care for others, and by extension, the environment itself. Furthermore, some have criticized
the problematic tendency within the field to essentialize indigenous women especially as
inherently more capable of caring for or “saving” the environment due to their proximity to
nature, often problematically labelling them “feminists” although many of those women may not
necessarily identify as such (Shiva 1992; Sturgeon 1997; Sturgeon 1999). Although I often use
the term “activist” to describe those who are engaged in work that further threatens the status
quo, I am primarily describing these individuals because they are being labelled as “terrorists.” I
have not selected them because they are “activists,” but because they are labelled in similar
ways.
In the same vein, I emphasize here that indigenous struggles for recognition and basic
human rights are broad and should not be limited to simply environmental activism, although
this is often described as intrinsically related to the overall human security of many indigenous
peoples who choose to engage in activism. Certainly, defense of land and natural resources has
been emphasized by many indigenous resisters but often encompasses a much broader struggle
for the health and recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. Activist Faith Gemmill (1996)
states, “from a traditional perspective, the health of our Peoples cannot be separated from the
health of the environment, the practice of our spirituality and the expression of our inherent right
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to self-determination, upon with the mental, physical, and social health of our communities is
based.”
Faith Gemmill emphasizes the inextricable relationship between environmental health
and the health of many indigenous Peoples. As I have previously mentioned, environmental and
colonial violence have had detrimental effects on indigenous populations. Here, the
manifestation of these broader structural threats can be seen manifesting as multiple facets of
human insecurity. Threats to environmental security contribute to health insecurity for many
peoples, as oil contamination and pollution affect natural resources (Adger et al. 2014; Szpak
2017). Whole communities have historically been impacted by these security threats, ending with
the death of large numbers of indigenous peoples. In addition to immediate physical threats to
the future of community security, indigenous communities have suffered longstanding abuses as
a result of the overall structural violence inflicted onto them, such as the enforcement of
practices that abducted indigenous children and forced them into Western schools in order to
“civilize” them and remove them from traditional environments (Castle et al. 2018).
The list is endless, but most threats to the environmental security and structural
environmental violence are intertwined in some ways with many other threats to the human
security of indigenous peoples. Although environmental threats often encompass broader and
deeper impacts on the human security of indigenous peoples as opposed to other environmental
activist groups, is my understanding that indigenous-led resistance certainly often encompasses
environmental activist practices and thus has some similarities with the broader environmental
activist movement. At certain points throughout this paper, I will refer to the environmental
activist movement and include indigenous resistance for simplification purposes. When my focus
is primarily on indigenous resistance, I will often employ the terms “defenders” and “resisters.”
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The murder of Berta Caceres is just one example of an upward slope of murders of
environmental activists globally, many of which have been women. Female environmental
activists have also described sexual harassment and assault after engaging in protest. In the
documentary film Laguna Negra, anti-extraction protesters gathered in nonviolent protest of UKbased company Monterrico Metals in Huacabanca, Peru (Watts 2009). Many were rural farmers
whose families had relied on the land to survive for many years. After being described as
“terrorists” both by news media and local workers, protesters were captured and detained for
several days, beaten, and starved. Cleofe Neyra describes in graphic detail the sexual assault
experienced by she and other women during their detainment.
The documentary film Warrior Women (2018) was directed and produced by Christina
King, Elizabeth Castle, and Anne Marie Pitman, and won a slew of awards. It depicts a group of
Lakota women who led successful activist movements throughout the latter half of the twentieth
century (King et al. 2018). The film opens with Madonna Thunder Hawk, a leader of the
movement, describing the graphic sexual assault of her friend by white men within the region
and states that notifying local police about the event would not likely have yielded results, as had
happened before. In turn, she and several other Native women tricked him into following him
behind a building and badly beat him, causing serious injury and halting sexual assault against
the local indigenous population in the following years. Throughout the following decades,
Madonna Thunder Hawk and others engaged in sit-ins, protests, and marches to protest industrial
development on the land in which their people had historically resided. Activist mothers also
describe the difficulties they faced in leaving their children to engage in this work.
Cases such as these exhibit multiple threats to the structures that have historically
inflicted violence onto marginalized communities: colonialism, patriarchal rule, and white
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supremacy. Through their engagement with environmental activism, they have also threatened
the environmental degradation that is entangled with all of these structures. In keeping with
theorists like C. Heike Schotten and Frantz Fanon, I argue that this is why they are labelled
“terrorists” and “violent.” They are positioned antithetically to structures that are founded on and
continue to inflict violence onto these communities.
I have argued violence is connected to environmental activism in two ways. First,
“violence” can be understood structurally as a multifaceted system that founds the basis for
multiple state and global structures, such as patriarchy, colonialism, white supremacy, etc. I have
previously described how these foundation of these structures are foundationally entangled in
and reliant on environmental degradation. These forms of structural violence can manifest in
different forms of direct violence, such as physical or sexual assault. Direct violence that
manifests from these structures can also be understood as a threat to human security, creating
community insecurity, gender insecurity, environmental insecurity, etc.
As people affected by these various forms of violence retaliate, they are labelled
“terrorists” or “violent” before they even commit any form of physical violence because they are
positioned antithetically the groups that have historically exercised power and violence over
them (colonizers, who have historically been white men). In some ways, they are born into these
identities (the colonized, the nonwhite individual, the woman). All are susceptible to some sort
of violence or punishment regardless of their identity through ties to environmental activism, but
the intersections of these facets of identities may present different manifestations of structural
violence and threats to human security. For example, indigenous women may be more likely to
experience sexual assault than white male environmental activists (Watts 2009).
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The “terrorist” or “violent” identity is an extension of those associated with nature and
the environment – the primitive “savage” or the inhuman African slave, the rooted woman, the
“tree-hugging” environmentalist. Because of this, they are threats to structures that rely on the
oppression of these people regardless of whether or not they commit acts of physical violence at
all. I further elaborate on specific cases that illuminate this argument in the following chapter.
Chapter Three: A Comparison
In this chapter, I compare two cases which highlight the use of “terrorist” framing of
indigenous-led protests surrounding oil development: the Peruvian political crisis of 2009 and
the 2016 Dakota Access Pipeline protests in the United States. Whilst the United States and Peru
(and the indigenous protestors per each case) certainly have many historical and cultural
differences, I have selected these two cases for a couple of reasons. First, both indigenous groups
in the United States and Peru cases were protesting oil development before state and security
forces responded with some form of physical violence. Second, although there are many
historical differences in state development between the two, both indigenous groups expressed
marginalization and dehumanization under their respective state structures (Latin American
Digital Beat Staff 2011; Fox et al. 2017). I understand this marginalization and dehumanization
to be a major component of structural violence.
A major difference between the Peruvian political crisis of 2009 and the Dakota Access
Pipeline (DAPL) protests of 2016 are the commitments (or lack of commitments) to nonviolence
by the groups involved. Members of the Great Sioux tribe in the DAPL case recurrently
emphasize a strong commitment to nonviolence; the indigenous-led coalition in Peru does not. I
argue that the precipitation of violence by the protestors are irrelevant for their earning “terrorist”
or “violent” labels or for receiving increased violent or punitive measures. They are already
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“terrorists” regardless of whether or not they engage in any sort of violent protest because their
identities have already been positioned as a threat to the status quo and the future of
“development.”
Peruvian political crisis of 2009
Between April and June 2009, political protests heightened between Peruvian state
military and police forces and a coalition of indigenous and mestizo peoples and allies within the
Amazonian and Andean regions over industrial expansion in the Peruvian Amazon after a series
of unsuccessful negotiations between the coalition and the Peruvian state government. President
Alan Garcia declared a national emergency, and media footage captured violent interactions
between state forces and the indigenous-led coalition (Bradenburg and Orzel 2016). Buildings
were destroyed, and the protests ended with the deaths of at least twenty-four police officers and
eleven indigenous protestors (Renique 2009; Stetson 2012); others report up to fifty deaths of
indigenous people and the burning of bodies following those deaths (Hughes 2010).
I am interested in the rhetoric employed by government officials that highlights the
increase of neoliberal extraction policies and longstanding colonial violence inflicted onto
indigenous peoples within the region. Several sources reveal President Garcia describing the
situation as the indigenous coalition simply “not understanding” the positive outcome of
increased development within the Amazonian region for “all” peoples within the area; this means
either that they “do not understand” the gravity of impeding on oil drilling or have somehow
been manipulated by outside agents with vested interests (Boelens et al. 2009; Stetson 2012).
These quotes illustrate what I have just demonstrated in my previous chapters – a
dehumanization of indigenous peoples that has long been employed under many colonial and
(neo)liberal regimes. Indigenous peoples are here described as impeding on “development”;
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moreover, they are framed as incapable of understanding the ways that this would benefit “all”
peoples within the region by stimulating economic development. Their identities are created as
antithetical threats to the progress of the state; their identities are dehumanized under a structural
violence that was necessary for the creation and perpetuation of the colonial state (e.g. the
“primitive savage”) (Schotten 2018; Altamirano-Jimenez 2013). This structural violence
continues to manifest with violence inflicted on the natural environment inhabited by these
peoples, as well as the direct violence that ensues – violent protests and threats to health,
community, and environmental security.
Renique (2009) notes that a large number of Achuar children located near the Rio
Corrientes downriver from Occidental Petroleum oil wells “suffer chronic malnutrition and
contamination from ingesting fish tainted with cadmium and mercury” (Renique 2009, 9). The
documentary Two Worlds Collide also features children swimming in streams caked with murky
oil as parents struggle to find live fish to serve their children. These are just two of many threats
to health security suffered by indigenous peoples of the Peruvian Amazonian region. This can,
and should, be understood as violence. It is a violence overwhelmingly ignored in depictions of
indigenous “precipitated” violence – a violence that should be understood as retaliatory under a
system of colonial and neoliberal structural violence, and a violence that can be understood as
imperative for the health and wellbeing of the peoples most directly affected by it (and arguably,
the world, as damage to the Amazon continues to impact us all through global climate change
and diminishment of natural resources).
Renique here quotes President Garcia, noting that the president also referred to protestors
as “pseudo-indigenous”: “These people don’t have crowns. They aren’t first-class citizens who
can say…’You [the government]’ don’t have the right to be here’. No way.” (Renique 2009, 5).
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President Garcia is demonizing protestors in several ways here; first, he notes that indigenous
peoples are not citizens; they are not Peruvians, and they do not have claims to Amazonian
territory. In this quote, indigenous peoples should not be treated as “first-class citizens.” In
contrast, Garcia presumably believes that he and other Peruvian citizens should be considered
first-class citizens and treated as such, with their own interests prioritized. Once again, Garcia
positions protestors as outsider threats to the state in an attempt to delegitimize them.
In a broader sense, Garcia’s referring to protestors as “pseudo-indigenous” is reminiscent
of some of the types of psychological abuse that Frantz Fanon often describes under colonial
regimes – the intent to delegitimize colonized identities and existence (Fanon 1963). Not only
does Garcia position indigeneity as an impediment to “development,” he publicly suggests that
these protestors do not have legitimate claims to an indigenous identity. Structural violence
through colonialism intends to colonize both bodies and minds through a variety of means:
physical harm, the internalization of negative images of oneself among the colonized, and more
directly (in the United States), the forced assimilation of indigenous children into white boarding
schools that often forced them to cut their hair and adopt Western “Christian” names and
identities.
The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP)
notes the robbing of identity present in demolishment of and encroachment onto indigenous
territories by Peruvians or other state officials. AIDESEP wrote a letter to Garcia criticizing his
plans to move forward with further oil development and extraction within the rainforest and on
traditionally indigenous territories, claiming the scheme was “devised for the exclusive benefit of
transnational capitalists whose investments would further deplete Amazonian territories, leaving
them ‘without resources, without air, without water and without identity’” (Renique 2009).
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Indigenous resistance should certainly not be limited to conceptions about environmental
activism; however, environmental health certainly seems often to be intrinsic to the health of
many indigenous peoples on a multitude of levels. Structural violence encompasses all of these
interrelated threats to human security.
In addition to describing the protestors as “pseudo-indigenous,” Garcia also associates the
broader indigenous-led protests with communism. Stetson (2012) writes, “President Garcia’s
perro del hortelano discourse misrepresents indigenous perspectives on development. Garcia
implies that environmental activists allied with indigenous causes are heavily influenced by
socialist perspectives. He writes that the present-day environmentalists are in fact ‘yesterday’s
communists,’ who have changed their red shirts for green ones” (14). Here, Garcia employs a
similar type of rhetoric to what C. Heike Schotten describes as the “othering” of the modern
“terrorist” - the “terrorist” that was once the “savage” or the “communist” (Schotten 2018, 129).
Garcia also directly refers to the protestors as “terrorists” on occasion, suggesting that they are
taking lead from an “international ‘anti-system’ force” (Renique 2009). Most interestingly,
President Garcia smears the protestors with all three of these labels on various occasions,
although the group does not indicate any sort of allegiance to communist or socialist principles
(Stetson 2012). Thus, Garcia not only works to cultivate a derogatory image of the protestors but
a threatening one. As he labels the protestors “savages,” “communists,” and “terrorists,” he
labels their existences and interests a threat to “progress” and a threat to greater Peruvian
interest.
Indigeneity as a threat to modernity
President Garcia uses the perro del hortelano metaphor to describe the situation between
government officials, Petroperu (the oil company over which the protests developed), and the
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indigenous-led coalition. Perro del hortelano is the story of “the gardener’s dog.” In the story, a
watchdog guards over a farm, preventing any other animals from eating from the farm. However,
the dog is unaware that allowing the other animals to eat from the farm is actually best for
everyone (Stetson 2012). Garcia expresses that such “uncultivated” land is for the use and
benefit of all Peruvians. Perhaps oil expansion within the region might, in fact, benefit the region
financially; however, this oil expansion would pose many direct human security threats to the
indigenous inhabitants of the area (health security; environmental security; food security, etc.).
Garcia describes the protestors as simply “not understand[ing]” the benefit that such oil
development would have for all of Peru, suggesting that the protestors are unaware of the
possibilities for “development” here. What Garcia does not acknowledge is that “development”
for some of Peru might not necessarily mean “development” for all of Peru.
Indigenous peoples are oftentimes externally associated with “traditional” and “natural”
solutions to environmental issues that can be problematic and biased in what one considers
modernity and development. The logic of “development” is that one (or one state) should always
be on a forward trajectory; thus, by associating indigenous peoples with only “traditional” issue
solutions, the identity of indigeneity is solidified in the past. Stetson (2012) highlights that there
are many organizations created by indigenous groups that are working to implement climate
change solutions within the area. For many of these individuals, the type of “development”
associated with oil drilling is not really development at all under the threat of climate change.
The denigration of indigenous knowledge and perspectives as something purely
traditional or even “backwards” or “savage” is just another representation of a violence inflicted
onto indigenous populations in a structure that is based on their oppression and repression.
Someone in a position such as the presidency likely has much more power to name what
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constitutes things – violence, terrorism, development, etc. By reinforcing what “development”
means in this context (oil drilling), President Garcia has positioned the indigenous protestors as
outside of that development and as threats to development.
I have argued that the identity of the “terrorist” is created in opposition to a status quo
that is often the manifestation of a neocolonial, patriarchal ideology. Not only were the protestors
described directly as “terrorists,” they were associated with other dehumanizing claims and are
described as allegedly “violent communists” and “savages.” In this case, the indigenous-led
coalition is not only described as targeting a corporation – in positioning the indigenous identity
opposite “development” and “modernity,” President Garcia thus makes them a threat to that
modernity and to the future of greater Peru altogether. As I have argued, threatening
“development” or industry can alone be enough to warrant a “violent” label. They are “terrorists”
because they are threatening the future of industrial development within the region. They are
“terrorists” not only because of what they are actively doing within this one particular context in
the 2009 political crisis, but they are “terrorists” based on their perceived identities – identities
that are associated with backwardness, with traditionalism, and with threats to state
“development.”
2016 Dakota Access Pipeline protests
In 2016, construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline was feared by many as an
environmental threat and threat to native sovereignty, thus prompting an indigenous-led protest
that attracted activists and allies. Local police officers and private security company TigerSwan
became involved in patrolling the area in an effort to move forward with the pipeline. After
enduring a bitter winter of physically blocking areas required for pipeline development, security
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forces infiltrated the Oceti Sakowin protest camp, attacking Sioux people and allies with dogs,
rubber bullets, pepper spray, mace, and water cannons.
According to the Stand with Standing Rock website, Oceti Sakowin was “a first of its
kind historic gathering of Indigenous Nations” (Oceti Sakowin 2019). The most recent such
assembly of Tribes occurred when the Great Sioux Nation gathered before the Battle at the Little
Big Horn. The group had previously been ordered to leave or face arrest. Before she was arrested
and charged with the misdemeanor “physical obstruction of government function,”
photojournalist Tracie Williams captured the tactics of the squad infiltrating the camp.
Photographs reveal officers in military-style uniforms pointing assault rifles at men in prayer and
slicing open teepees with large knives. Numerous other protestors were also arrested when the
camp was infiltrated.
Reference to the Battle of Little Big Horn further elucidates perceived indigenous
“threats” to the structural makeup of the United States (neocolonialism, neoliberalism, white
supremacy, patriarchy, etc.) and their bases in structural violence. U.S. troops, who had
continually driven native groups west and away from traditional and sacred land, were ambushed
by a large group of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors. United States soldiers killed in the battle were
exalted following the event, as it became synonymously known as “General Custer’s Last
Stand.” The veneration of Custer’s “last stand” does not simply describe the literal death of the
general: it also seems to praise his metaphorical “last stand” in defending U.S. citizens or their
way of life.
Both the Oceti Sakowin website and native voices throughout the documentary film
“Awake, A Dream from Standing Rock” directly reference The Battle of Little Big Horn and
Custer’s literal and metaphorical roles: his brigade’s direct attack on indigenous people and their
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roles (as well as the roles of their “descendants”) as representatives and protectors of the Colony
(Fox et al. 2017). In the eyes of many Americans, however, Custer’s death was viewed as heroic
and patriotic; following the success of the indigenous coalition at Little Big Horn, attacks on
indigenous populations only heightened as they were forcibly relegated to smaller areas of land
for the interests of U.S. citizens (History 2019).
As a result of the necessity of this subjugation for U.S. property rights, the desire and
calculated move to demonize and criminalize native peoples was present in narratives preceding
and following the Battle of Little Big Horn. These narratives can be linked (and are linked by
voices throughout the film) to present in narratives that paint nonviolent indigenous groups as
violent criminals in order to justify violent action against them. The film’s narrator, Floris White
Bull, emphasizes that her people “are not criminals” and that protestors were completely
unarmed, as do many other voices throughout the film (Fox et al. 2017).
Furthermore, one person stresses that the movement is so foundationally opposed to
violence that they would rather allies “stay home” if they do not come in peace. Throughout the
film, voices reinforce a narrative of humanity present in county police and DAPL private
security that does not seem to be granted in response: “they are still our brothers,” “still human
under the armor,” and are guests on Mother Earth just as the Sioux are. Myron Dewey, one of the
film’s directors, states that county police were not originally hostile toward protestors, but that
“DAPL police ate at them.” Dewey claims that county police served as a distraction, or puppets,
as the pipeline itself was laid; this further supports the argument that private corporations are not
only allied protectors of the colonizer but are something intrinsic to the perpetuity of the colonial
state.
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“Terrorism” itself is directly referenced both at the beginning and toward the close of the
film. Initially, a Native veteran describes the pain and guilt he has suffered since his tours in Iraq
in 2003 and 2004, “when we got there, we realized [that] this war is not about terrorists; this war
is about oil. This war is about money.” This person seems to be reflecting on the idea that there
is actually no such thing as the “terrorist” at all; rather, it is an identity created in opposition to
the aims of the United States government (a government that is bound in the interest of industry).
Later in the film, another person expresses his fear of the term being used to describe the
protests, conveying that the U.S. government strategically uses the terms “terrorist” and
“terrorism” to achieve its desires and allot itself special powers in the ways that it attempts to
silence or punish certain actors or groups, “I think the real danger is that the powers that be will
try to elevate the status of what we’re trying to do here as ‘domestic terrorism,’ and that becomes
a justification for more vicious and massive repression. The human rights have already been
violated on a number of different levels.” The voices of other nonwhite, non-indigenous allies
stand in solidarity and echo that these themes are common among other marginalized groups in
the United States.
Linked documents later revealed counterterrorist tactics used against protestors by
TigerSwan, who often referred to the protestors as “jihadists” despite the fact that they seemingly
have no dedication to an ideological aim linked to some “terrorist” groups (Deem 2019; Brown
et al. 2017). Christianity is the predominant religion in the United States (Pew Research Center
2020). It has served as a means to justify the subjugation of indigenous peoples since the
foundation of the settler-state and remains a component of what many might believe to be a
“true” American. “Jihadist” rhetoric evokes an emphasis on the “radical” nature of the
environmental movement, as the jihad often denotes a movement that will turn the current social
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order on its head. It is a term often used by government officials to legitimize the War on Terror
and the degradation of Islam as something inherently violent. To equate a nonviolent movement
that does not seem to be associated with the Islamic faith is unsupported, misguided, and
deliberate.
This type of behavior shares similarities with other instances on environmental protest,
such as President Garcia’s aforementioned allegations that indigenous protestors in Peru were
“communists” and “terrorists” in disguise, although the movement had no ties to communism or
socialism. The Guardian has also reported counterterrorism tactics used against nonviolent
environmental protestors across the world (Dodd and Grierson 2020). This type of discourse was
strategically employed to play on tropes typically used to demonize and dehumanize other
groups both historically and in the present United States in order to further the aims of industrial
expansion.
Violence and nonviolence: the irrelevant distinction
I have just described two cases in which indigenous-led coalitions acted on behalf of
environmental protections by impeding on the development of a state-supported industrial
venture. In both cases, security forces responded with direct violence to protestors who were
blocking access to the areas in which oil development was set to move forward. I have argued
that in both places, indigenous groups are currently and have historically been the victims of
structural violence under (neo)colonialism that has encompassed entire ways of living within the
bounds of the state structure.
In the DAPL case, a private security company worked alongside local police forces in
order to bring protests to a halt. In the Peruvian case, security forces seem to be largely state
police actors. A crucial difference here is each group’s philosophical position to nonviolence.
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Members of the Dakota Access Pipeline protest coalition repeatedly emphasized strong
commitments to nonviolence, whereas the indigenous coalition in Peru did not vocalize
commitments to nonviolence (Fox et al. 2017; Bradenburg and Orzel 2016). In the photographs
and documentary footage for each corresponding case, images capture DAPL protestors fleeing
the scene or sitting and praying; the Peruvian case escalated to that of a large-scale political crisis
with a death count as the indigenous-led coalition responded to police forces with physical
violence. This paper does not take a normative position on the most effective or appropriate way
to respond to violence (either structural or direct), but I argue that the precipitation of physical
violence by protestors is irrelevant for earning the “violent” or “terrorist” label. The “violent” or
“terrorist” label is created as a group or person threatens the fabric and future of the state and all
that that entails – colonial foundations, white supremacy, patriarchy, and allegiance to land,
territorial, and industrial rights. A discussion on the role of identity in earning the “terrorist”
label is at the crux of this argument.
DAPL, Peru, and broader “eco-terrorism”
I argue that commonalities exist surrounding the language employed by state officials and
state and private security forces between these two cases, as well as cases of “eco-terrorism” in
which many of the perceived “terrorists” are often white and often men. These commonalities
include a perceived “violent” identity of the protestors and/or movement, the elevation of that
“violent” identity to one of the “terrorist,” and intent or actions taken by those in power to inflict
some type of punishment onto those deemed “terrorists” (direct violence and/or punitive legal
measures). These cases share in common a vested interest in environmental protections; in states
and situations where industrial development is often privileged over environmental sustainability
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and the territorial rights of indigenous peoples, these protestors are thus deemed a “threat” to the
status quo, a threat to industrial development, and a threat to the fabric of the state.
The major difference that exists across these movements is that of the identity of the
protestors. White “eco-terrorists” are not necessarily born into that role in the same way that
nonwhite, indigenous peoples are born into their own identities. I have described the
dehumanization of the indigenous “savage” which existed long before a popular environmental
movement developed in the United States; as the “savage” and in this case as the “terrorist,”
these indigenous peoples were born into an identity that threatens the colonial state.
Indigenous peoples were perceived as “savages” based on differences to their settler
counterparts: race, religion, dress, and entire way of life. However, one crucial difference here is
that of relationship to the environment and to land. The conquering and exploitation of
indigenous peoples was often heavily intertwined with the conquering and exploitation of land
and the environment for white settler gain. Likewise, indigenous peoples’ proximity to nature
and relationship with land and the environment was also intrinsically associated with the creation
of the “savage” identity. Now, in both the Peruvian and Dakota Access pipeline cases, these
“savage” identities become the “terrorist” identities as thecse groups and individuals continue to
act in favor of the environment over industry. The environmental element is not the only
component that makes of the creation of the “savage” or “terrorist” identity, but it also cannot be
separated from it. While these activists engaged in an action (protest) that brought them visibility
and might have contributed to prominent discussion on their role as “terrorists” and “savages,”
these types of labels and frames used to describe indigenous peoples are at least centuries old and
exist across borders.
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White environmental activists, in contrast, probably do have to engage in some sort of
action to be labelled an “eco-terrorist.” In the cases I have described, these actions are not
physically violent; they might entail some sort of property damage, but in the case of white
allies’ actions during the Dakota Access Pipeline protests, those actions might not include
property damage at all but strictly an impediment to industrial enterprise. Thus, these white
activists then adopt an identity, and likely one that they have not prescribed for themselves
(similar to the identity thrust onto the “savage” native). This identity is also radicalized, it is
intrinsic to their relationship to nature and environmental protections, and it is deemed “violent”
because it poses a direct and physical threat industry- and thus threatens state allegiance to
industry, and it threatens those who benefit from their position to power in that structure. In some
ways, white environmental activists adopt an identity adjacent to that of the indigenous protestor
as they, too, begin to threaten the state’s framework and the interests of industry.
Labelling these groups “terrorists” does a couple of things for those who are initiating
these labels. First, it associates protestors with all that the “terrorist” frame has come to represent
– an “evil,” “irrational,” “extremist” person who presumably will not work to achieve their
desired goals in a “civil” way. Second, it allows for extralegal measures be taken in order to
quell the perceived “terrorist” threat. In the United States, charging activists who engaged in
property damage with “terrorism” rather than whatever other crime they might have committed
(such as arson, destruction to private property, or theft) has elevated prison sentences and
allowed for counterterrorist and extralegal measures to be taken.
Prior to the 2009 Peruvian political crisis, “terrorist” threats allowed for President Garcia
to lessen constraints on police forces to act with direct violence to those deemed a threat. This
extended to the indigenous protests that happened in 2009 (Boelens et al. 2009). Some have
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suggested that the deaths of indigenous protestors are much higher than acknowledged by the
government, and that indigenous bodies were burned in order to conceal the evidence of those
deaths; additionally, protests leader have sought refuge in Nicaragua after being charged with
“terrorism” (Boelens et al. 2009). “Terrorism” is inherently a strategic term used to achieve
desired ends, and in the cases, those desired ends are enmeshed in environmental subjugation and
industrial allegiances.
Conclusion
This project explores the concept of “violence” as it relates to environmental activism. In
keeping with Galtung (1969), I argue that violence is structural. Structural violence has no clear
actor; it is systemic and encompasses much more than just physical violence. This violence is
multifaceted and hinges one one’s position within a system. For the purposes of this paper, I
have discussed some of the ways in which indigenous peoples are the victims of structural
violence, as the state structure itself is founded on their oppression. They have not only suffered
direct, physical violence as a result of this but also often do not even have the power to name
what constitutes legitimate violence. What structural violence tells us is that some violences
(state-based violence and violence perpetrated by those in power) are legitimized or minimized,
while violences precipitated by those victimized within the structure are not often legitimized but
are instead described as “extremist” or “terroristic.”
Under structural violence, those in power are able to name what violence is at all,
regardless of whether or not someone or some group precipitates an act of physical violence.
Under structural violence, those in power are able to legitimate not only direct violence but are
able to minimize or ignore slower types of violence that result from state regulations and norms,
such as anthropogenic climate change and a lack of access to basic needs that threaten human
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security. In my reading, Frantz Fanon describes this dichotomy as the “system of terror” that is
colonialism versus the “terrorist” identity that is created by the colonizer (Fanon 1963). In this
dichotomy, the concept of “terror” is systemic and entirely dependent on who has the power to
name what constitutes “terror” and what constitutes legitimate “violence” under colonialism.
I have used these two thinkers to extrapolate to the use of “terrorist” and “violent” labels
as they correspond to environmental activism using examples from the broader environmental
movement and two cases in which indigenous-led environmental protests were described as
“terrorism” in the United States and Peru. Similar to C. Heike Schotten (2018), I argue that
“terrorism” is an identity thrust onto individuals who threaten the status quo and future of the
state structure, as well as the structures intrinsic to that state structure. Environmental activists
might choose to engage in a physically violent protest, but I argue that this is irrelevant; they are
violent not because of something that they have done, but because their identity is positioned
antithetically to the state by those who have the power to name them and whatever actions are
precipitated by them.
This project raises questions about agency in environmental violence: who exactly is
associated with violence and terrorism and who has the power to label and legitimate violence? I
have argued that activists receive “violent” labels because their identities threaten the structure of
the state. Further research should examine more closely those who precipitate violence as agents
of the state, whether they be local police or state military forces. Questions arise on just how
much agency they themselves have to act under the current state and global structures I have
mentioned, as they also are subject to them and act accordingly based on their roles within the
system. A broader selection of case study analyses will also will also provide more insight into
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when exactly the “terrorist” label is prompted as it relates to environmental activism and
environmental resistance.
It also raises questions about gender, race, and ethnicity in environmental activism.
Future projects should center questions of gender, race, and ethnicity in questions about the
prescription of “violent” labels as they correspond to environmental activism. For example, how
are female environmental activists described by state actors and news media with respect to their
male counterparts? A gendered discourse analysis of cases of perceived “eco-terrorism” will
provide useful research for feminist international security studies and women’s roles as agents in
environmental activism.
This project contributes to research on structural violence and is it corresponds to who
has the capacity to label legitimate violence (or illegitimate violence) in a state structure that
relies on violence against the environment and violence against various groups of people. It
attests to broader themes of dehumanization provoked by the popular use of labels like “terrorist”
and “terrorism” and urges the reader to question what defines “violence” and how it relates to
questions of power and structural inequalities.
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